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Executive Summary 
 Forty-five states have adopted some form of constitutional limitation on their own 
legislature’s ability to issue debt and raise capital. Eleven states have more than one such 
limitation. It seems intuitive to assume that constitutional strictures on a state’s ability to 
manage its fiscal policy would affect that state’s standing in the market, and it seems equally 
safe to assume that different combinations of the various forms of debt limitation would lead to 
varying effects in the market from state to state. However, the specific effects arising from the 
various constitutional provisions have proven to be difficult to measure. This research explores 
the substance of these constitutional debt limitations, the history of academic research 
attempting to measure the effects of these limitations, and the fruitfulness or futility of these 
academic attempts.  
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I. Preamble 
 The term “municipal debt” can be confusing to the uninitiated. There are at least two 
sources of this confusion. First, the term can refer both to debt issued by a local government 
(municipality) and to debt issued by a state government. This distinction is substantive, because 
many states treat local government issues differently than state government issues, either 
statutorily or constitutionally (or both). 
 The second source of confusion concerning the meaning of the term “municipal debt” 
derives from the special tax status of many, but not all, municipal issuances (or bonds). The 
federal government provides terms by which proceeds from municipal bonds may be tax-exempt; 
that is, as long as the issuance meets the standards set by the Internal Revenue Service, 
purchasers of those corresponding bonds pay no taxes on the proceeds of those bonds. When 
market actors speak of “municipal debt,” or “municipal bonds,” those actors are typically 
referring to tax-exempt municipal debt. However, much debt undertaken by municipalities and 
states do not meet these federal standards, and consequently taxable “municipal debt” is far from 
rare.  
 The research presented in this paper focuses on state-issued, tax-exempt municipal debt. 
Any references made to “municipal debt” or “municipal bonds” designates only this limited class 
of debt. The limitation is more practical than theoretical; while the correlations relayed in this 
study may apply equally to locally-issued and taxable debt, a six-state survey of all debt 
issuances over a five-year period exceeds the scope of this project. Instead, the research limits its 
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attention to state issuances from the period spanning the years 2013-2017, across the selected 
states.  
 
II. Introduction 
 State constitutions differ from the U.S. Constitution in many ways. For example, while 
the U.S. Constitution establishes a federalist system in which the U.S. government possesses 
limited, specifically enumerated powers to regulate, states are not comparably limited in the 
scope of their regulatory reach (Sterk & Goldman 1304). Furthermore, state constitutions tend to 
be more easily amendable than the U.S. Constitution (Sterk & Goldman 1304). These two 
qualities, taken together, are conducive to the evolution of state constitutions that advocate 
specific policy positions, many of which are reactionary, “provoked by local crises of the 
moment.” (Sterk & Goldman 1304). With the passage of time, some of these provisions grow 
irrelevant, or worse, antithetical to the needs and functions of the modern state (Sterk & 
Goldman 1304).  
 No state-level constitutional provision embodies this process more clearly than 
constitutionally-mandated restrictions on the issuance of municipal debt. Only five states have no 
constitutional provision limiting the state issuance of debt (Kiewiet & Szakaly 67). The vast 
majority of these constitutional provisions were adopted by the states in the middle- to late 
nineteenth century in response to a deluge of ill-conceived debt-financed infrastructure projects 
preceding the economic depression of 1837 (Kiewiet & Szakaly 67). After several states 
defaulted on their debt obligations in the wake of the 1837 depression, a trend toward 
constitutionally mandated “fiscal responsibility” swept the nation.  
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 While strictly limiting a state’s ability to issue debt may have seemed like good fiscal 
policy in 1850 (when Kentucky adopted its constitutional provision), most contemporary fiscal 
policy analysts advocate for debt financing of infrastructure investment as preferable to paying 
“as you go” (O’Hara 57). These proponents of state debt funding argue that the costs of those 
infrastructure investments should be paid by those taxpayers taking advantage of the benefits of 
the investment (O’Hara 57-59). Whereas the antiquated fiscal theory posited that future 
generations should not be obligated to pay for the excesses of the current generation, most 
contemporary fiscal analysts argue that current taxpayers also should not be obligated to pay for 
infrastructure improvements that will benefit future generations (O’Hara 57-59). Thus, the 
reactionary policy embodied in the constitutional debt limits adopted in the 1800s now runs 
counter to the exigencies of contemporary state fiscal management.  
 Furthermore, research in the field indicates that constitutional debt limits may be actively 
harmful to the fiscal health of those states that have them. Rather than repeal the constitutional 
debt limits, many states have devised “work-arounds” that allow them to issue debt and raise 
capital without violating the literal terms of the constitutional mandates. Recent research has 
suggested that these work-arounds are not without costs, however. The artifice of the work-
arounds may lead to lower credit ratings, higher coupon rates, or both. Also, there is limited 
evidence that states with more restrictive constitutional debt limitations do not issue any less debt 
than those states with less restrictive mandates.  
 This research explores the topic of the effects of constitutional debt limits on coupon 
rates and number of issuances from a period spanning from 2013 to 2017. I begin with a brief 
history of municipal debt, the adoption of constitutional debt limitations, and the states’ 
strategies for circumventing the constitutional mandates. I follow this history with a review of 
pg. 6 
 
the literature that focuses on the effects, both intended and unintended, of the constitutional 
mandates. I then describe the data and the development of the model applied in this research. I 
conclude with my results and a brief summary of the implications of those results. 
III. Historical Background 
 State issuance of debt in the form of municipal bonds in the United States predates the 
American Revolution, and the states accumulated considerable debt in order to finance the war 
(Kiewiet & Szakaly 64). Alexander Hamilton estimated in January of 1790 that the sixteen states 
of the Union owed a collective $25,000,000 (Ratchford 50). Hamilton saw this debt as a threat to 
the economic viability of the several states, and advocated fiercely for the federal assumption of 
this burden (Ratchford 67). Hamilton was successful, and the United States assumed all but 
approximately $3,000,000 of the states’ debt (Ratchford 68). The federal assumption left a few 
states completely debt-free, and the majority of states were left with nominal, easily-managed 
debts that were further reduced by sound state fiscal policy (Ratchford 68).  
 Following the federal assumption of the several states’ debts, those states largely avoided 
debt financing. New York was a minor exception, and borrowed nominal amounts, beginning 
with $73,000 in 1797 (Ratchford 73). However, these funds typically entered the general fund, 
and the state utilized the capital primarily to pay for daily operations. Then, in 1812, New York 
undertook a new approach to debt, and the actions of the state led to a revolution in debt 
financing across the country.  
 In 1812, the City of New York issued the first officially labeled “municipal bond” 
(Cockren et al. 135). This issuance was fundamentally different from previous municipal and 
state debts, because the inaugural municipal bond was the first state-issued debt to be issued in 
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order to pay for internal infrastructure improvements, and was issued in order to pay for the 
construction of a new City Hall (Cockren et al. 135). Prior to this issuance, state issued debt had 
been used either to meet war costs or to cover operating deficits (Ratchford 74). A new round of 
state debt briefly flourished as states sought to support their war efforts during the War of 1812, 
but with the exception of New York, state debts entering the 1820s were nominal and 
manageable (Ratchford 77).  
 After New York utilized the first recognized municipal bond for infrastructure investment 
in 1812, it embraced this mode of financial funding of infrastructure needs with eager abandon. 
In 1817, the state began construction of the Erie Canal, which was completed in 1825. The canal 
was municipal bond-funded, and the costs of construction reached $7 million (Ratchford 82). 
However, despite the exorbitant cost of the construction and the concomitant debt burden to the 
state, the Erie Canal was widely considered an unreserved success ((Kiewiet & Szakaly 64). 
Trade along the route grew exponentially, and thriving villages and cities sprung up along the 
river, providing increased economic activity within the state and growing property tax revenues 
for the state coffers (Ratchford 82-83). Other states saw the success of the Erie Canal project, 
recognized that the costs of debt can be outweighed by the benefits of increased economic 
activity that result from prudent investment of the capital raised, and an early conception of the 
revenue bond began to take form (Kiewiet & Szakaly 64).1  
 While the spate of state borrowing for large infrastructure investments laid the foundation 
for the state debt crisis that was to follow, the Depression of 1837 played a large role in 
transforming a potential crisis into an actual one. The Depression played two distinct roles in 
                                                          
1 Revenue bonds are debt issuances “for which specific revenues, not governments’ full faith, credit, and taxing 
power, are the source of repayment” (O’Hara 5).  
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undermining the debt-financed investment strategies of the states. First, many of the large 
infrastructure projects (such as railroads, canals, and turnpikes) were incomplete when the 
Depression struck (Kiewiet & Szakaly 64). The states were forced to choose between 
abandoning the project and losing the investment to that point, or continuing to debt-finance the 
project despite the skyrocketing interest rates (and consequently, skyrocketing costs of capital to 
the states) (Kiewiet & Szakaly 64). Second, the Depression led to a substantial decrease in 
economic activity nationally, which, in turn, led to the completed infrastructure projects 
producing less revenue than expected for the states (Kiewiet & Szakaly 64). Eventually, nine 
states defaulted on their debt in the wake of the 1837 Depression (Kiewiet & Szakaly 65). State 
legislators advocated for a federal assumption of the oppressive debt burden, but unlike the 
earlier assumption proposal supported by Hamilton, this latter movement failed to develop the 
strength to succeed in the federal Congress (Ratchford 103-104).  
 What followed was a crisis of confidence for state debt issuers in the United States. 
Foreign investment in state instruments dwindled, and infrastructure projects sat incomplete, 
with the states lacking the necessary capital to continue their construction (Kiewiet & Szakaly 
64). State legislators, in order to regain investor confidence, were forced to adopt unpopular 
revenue measures such as excise and property tax increases (Kiewiet & Szakaly 65). Taxpayers 
responded with outrage, and they demanded that the legislators establish protections against 
irresponsible debt accrual. According to Benjamin Ratchford, “[p]revious to 1840 no state 
constitution limited the debt which the legislature might incur, but within a period of fifteen 
years thereafter the constitutions of nineteen states were amended to include such limitations” 
(121).2 Rhode Island was the first state to adopt a debt-limiting constitutional amendment, when 
                                                          
2 Note that there were thirty-one states in 1855. 
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it both created a referendum requirement for debt issuances and capped debt to no more than 
$50,000 (Ratchford 122). Currently, there are only five states that have no constitutional limit on 
debt (Kiewiet & Szakaly 65).  
 Justice Louis Brandeis once famously wrote in dissent that “[i]t is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as 
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country” (New State Ice Co. 311). This principle of federalism could not be clearer than in the 
various states’ approaches to constitutional debt limitation. While “virtually every state 
constitution has some unique features in its debt provisions,” Roderick Kiewiet and Kristin 
Szakaly, in their Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded 
Indebtedness, have identified four “basic forms” of state constitutional debt limitations (65). 
These four basic forms are critical in the methodology of this research and deserve a careful 
review.  
 Kiewiet and Szakaly offer the following four basic structures of state constitutional debt 
limitations:  
(i) the requirement that such bond issues be approved by the voters of the state 
in a referendum; (ii) the requirement that all guaranteed debt issues be approved 
by a supermajority (ranging from three-fifths to three-fourths) of the state 
legislature; (iii) a prohibition against issuing guaranteed debt; (iv) a provision 
limiting guaranteed debt to some fraction of state taxes, state expenditures, 
assessed property valuations, or some other revenue base (65).  
Twenty-one states have some form of referendum requirement. Twelve states have a 
supermajority requirement, and nine states have a prohibition against issuing guaranteed debt. 
Fifteen states have a formulaic limit applied to a specific revenue source, and five states have no 
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constitutional limitation whatsoever. Eleven states have more than one form of debt limit, which 
explains why the above-enumerated list provides for fifty-seven applications over forty-five 
states (Kiewiet & Szakaly 65).  
 With such an impressive array of constitutional debt limitations in force across the nation, 
one would expect the several states’ ability to issue debt to be severely curtailed. However, as 
was mentioned earlier in this paper, states could hardly function in the complex, contemporary 
economy without practical access to debt financing. The routes that individual states have taken 
to access credit markets is even more variegated than the field of constitutional limitations 
themselves. The variety stems both from the different legislative approaches to circumventing 
the constitutional limitations and also from the state courts’ various interpretations of the 
constitutional mandates. Sterk and Goldman argue that while constitutional debt limitations do 
little to actually limit debt, the constitutional provisions do take some fiscal decision-making 
power away from the state legislatures and grant it to the state’s judiciary. For a clarifying 
example, I now look at Kentucky’s experience. 
 Kentucky’s first Constitution, drafted in Danville, Kentucky, and approved by the United 
States Congress in 1792, did not include a limitation on debt (Legislative Research Commission 
12-13). However, by 1850, the state’s debt had grown to $4.5 million (or approximately $145.8 
million in 2019 dollars), and the next iteration of the state’s constitution unambiguously limited 
debt to $500,000 (Kleber 225). This limitation was roughly equal to one year’s revenue receipts 
at the time, but the amount has not been subsequently adjusted for inflation, despite the fact that 
current state revenue projections for 2019 exceed $11 billion (Legislative Research Commission 
14). The strict limitation on general obligation debt also included a provision that any such debt 
is allowed only with the permission of the electorate through a direct vote during a general 
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election year (Legislative Research Commission 14). Thus, Kentucky is one of the twenty-one 
states that require referendum approval for long-term debt issuance, though many companion 
states have much larger, more functional nominal limits (Kiewiet and Szakaly 65). 
 The Commonwealth and its municipalities have attempted “creative” structurings of debt-
like instruments over the years in attempts to circumvent the constitutional limit, but the state’s 
Supreme Court has resisted a “formalistic” interpretation of these instruments and has 
consequently stricken many attempts at long-term debt issuance as unconstitutional. 
 A foremost example is Curlin v. Wetherby. In this 1955 case, the high court considered 
the constitutionality of the legislature’s grant of authority to the Kentucky Highway Authority to 
issue long-term municipal bonds (935). The legislature had structured the transaction in a manner 
intended to bypass the debt limitation (935). First, in establishing the Kentucky Highway 
Authority, the legislature transferred selected state highways to the Authority (935). The 
Authority would then issue municipal bonds backed only by the full faith and credit of the 
Authority (and not the full faith and credit of the state) (935). The Authority would use the bond 
proceeds to improve the selected highway systems, and finally, the state would then lease back 
the improved highways from the Authority (935). The state would make the lease payments by 
using revenues from gasoline and motor vehicle taxes (935). 
 The Kentucky Supreme Court struck down the law (Curlin 935). The Court began its 
analysis by defining “debt” as the commitment of future revenues with the inability to later 
abandon the commitment (the “full faith and credit” obligation) (935). The Court held that while 
the proposed structure of the highway bonds led to municipal bond issuance that was not state 
“debt” in the traditional sense (because the bonds would be issued by the special authority, and 
consequently not backed by the full faith and credit of the state), the lease, on the other hand, 
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was an unconstitutional indebtedness (935). The Court focused on the terms of the lease, and 
specifically the language that pledged “current resources” of the Authority (composed of all 
monies accruing biennially to the State Road Fund) for the full term of the lease (935-937). The 
legislature tried to argue that the use of “special funds” consisting of gasoline and motor vehicle 
taxes avoided the constitutional limitation on the future commitment of revenues generally, but 
the Court did not agree with the legislature’s interpretation (935). The gasoline and motor 
vehicle taxes, the Court reasoned, are not collected for the use of “a particular facility,” but 
instead “for the use of the roads generally” (937). Consequently, the Court found, the funds are 
general revenue (937). By committing general funds “for the term of the lease,” the Court held, 
the legislature had violated the debt limitations of the Constitution of Kentucky (938-939). The 
“formalistic” approach of the legislature did not assuage the “substantive” constitutional 
requirements as interpreted by the Supreme Court.  
 Despite the Court’s insistence that the constitutional debt limit be given substantial 
deference, the legislature has managed to establish a procedure for accessing credit for capital 
projects that does not run afoul of the Court’s high standard. This constitutionally permissible 
structure is very similar to the structure of the Kentucky Highway Authority in Curlin v. 
Wetherby above, but with a couple of critically important “tweaks” to the methodology. The first 
substantive difference is that the state’s remittance of the lease payments to the municipal 
corporation or special authority is contractually guaranteed only for a biennium, eliminating the 
“for the full term of the lease” language found in Curlin (Hayes 802-803). 
 The second substantive difference between the methodology unsuccessfully pursued in 
Curlin and the current, operative methodology is that in the current system, lease payments are 
guaranteed only by revenue increases produced by the capital project, rather than by the state’s 
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general revenue (Hays 803-804). The Court has held in as early as 1925 that similar 
arrangements meet constitutional muster, and has consistently upheld this finding, despite 
several opportunities to relitigate the issue (Waller 1925). In general, the high court has thus 
established a three-pronged factor analysis for determining whether a debt issuance violates the 
constitutional limit on general obligation debt: 1) debt instrument cannot be issued directly by 
the state, but must be issued by a third-party entity such as a municipal corporation or special 
authority; 2) the contractual terms of the issuance cannot commit state funds beyond a period of 
two years; and 3) the relationship between the project being funded and the source of the debt 
service must be “sufficiently direct and apparent that . . . the . . . tax may be treated as revenue of 
the project” (Turnpike 557). The Commonwealth’s Supreme Court provides further latitude by 
holding that, if the debt issuance passed the factor analysis outlined above, it is not subject to the 
$500,000 absolute limitation, because it is not “debt” in the constitutional sense of the term 
(557).  
 While many state judiciaries have followed a path similar to Kentucky’s,3 others have 
interpreted similar constitutional language to require substantively different approaches. An 
excellent example is the judicial history of New Jersey’s approach to its constitutional limitation. 
New Jersey, like Kentucky, has both a limit on the amount of debt issued annually and a 
referendum requirement. Also similarly, the New Jersey legislature initially attempted to 
circumvent the constitutional provisions by establishing a public authority, the New Jersey 
Turnpike Authority. However, unlike in the holdings of the Kentucky legislature, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held in New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Parsons that simply the establishment 
                                                          
3 See, for example, the history of the judiciary’s interpretation of Ohio’s constitutional limit, as outlined in Sterk & 
Goldman (1334-1337).  
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of a public authority was enough to circumvent the constitutional requirements, despite the fact 
that the terms of the lease agreement with the turnpike authority committed state funds to a 
period much greater than a biennium (875).  
 This concludes the historical background for this research project. The goal of this project 
is to determine, through quantitative analysis, whether the four distinct forms of constitutional 
debt limitation outlined by Kiewet and Szakaly are successful in limiting debt issuance, and 
whether they come at a cost in the form of discernably higher costs of capital for those states 
with constitutional strictures. These questions are not entirely novel to this research, and I now 
provide a review of the literature addressing different aspects of these questions.  
IV. Literature Review 
Increased Cost of Capital 
 The primary difficulty with evaluating quantitatively the effects of constitutional debt 
limitations on the costs of capital is developing a model that disentangles those effects from 
unenumerable state-specific effects. This problem is illustrated in an early study by B. U. 
Ratchford in his “State and Local Debt Limitations,” published in 1958. While the article begins 
with an excellent history of debt limitations, including constitutional provisions, his quantitative 
analysis falls short. He begins by grouping states into three categories: 1) states with 
constitutional limits; 2) states with constitutional referendum requirements; and 3) states with 
legislative and statutory limits on debt issuance. Ratchford finds that the states with 
constitutional limits held debt half as large as those states with only legislative limits, and states 
with referendum requirements fell between these two extremes (225).  
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 While this approach may be interesting (and, in fact, I provide a similar analysis of the 
states for the years covered by this research), this simple descriptive approach fails to recognize 
the enormous effects of other state-specific factors not accounted for in the statistics. Ratchford 
recognizes the limitations of his approach (his study was written long before the widespread use 
of multiple regression models), and states clearly that “this comparison is interesting but 
probably not very significant” (226). There are any number of state-specific factors that may 
influence debt practices, and without a model that disentangles those effects from the effects of 
the constitutional limitations, there is a risk that any results may overestimate the causal 
relationship.  
 John O’Donnell, in his “The Tax Cost of Constitutional Debt Limitation in Indiana” 
(1962), develops an approach slightly more sophisticated than Ratchford’s descriptive statistical 
analysis. As the title suggests, O’Donnell focuses on debt issuances originating from Indiana. 
Indiana is one of a few states uniquely positioned for his approach, because the state’s limitation 
is functional, allowing legislators to issue general obligation debt up to two percent of the 
previous year’s property tax revenues. However, the state found that its need for debt financing 
consistently exceeded the two percent cap, and the legislature began utilizing the “work-around” 
of incorporating public authorities to meet its needs beyond the allowed general obligation debt. 
 O’Donnell’s model focuses specifically on bonds issued by the Indiana School Holding 
Corporation, and compares those bonds to bonds deriving from the state’s authority to issue 
general obligation debt. O’Donnell controls for the bond’s ratings and for the maturity dates of 
the issues and finds that the coupon rate for the special authority debt is “about 20 per cent more” 
than the coupon rate for the general obligation bonds (411). O’Donnell concludes that his 
pg. 16 
 
findings show “that American taxpayers are paying a substantial price for the privilege of 
maintaining statutory debt limits” (412).  
 Thomas Pogue was the first scholar to approach the issue by using a multiple regression 
model. Pogue, in his “The Effect of Debt Limits: Some New Evidence” (1970) calculated per 
capita total debt outstanding as a function of a multitude of explanatory variables, including the 
type of debt limitation in force, state income data, land area, percent change in population, 
urban/rural population proportions, as well as several other variables. He applied his model 
across the 48 contiguous states for the years 1958 and 1962. Pogue’s model found a statistically 
significant negative coefficient between the different debt limitations and the amount of per 
capita debt issued. 
 As I will explain more carefully in the model design section of this research, however, 
Pogue’s model contains a flaw that he (like I) will only partially correct. Pogue’s model fails to 
account for the state-specific effects; that is, the designation of whether a state has a 
constitutional limitation on debt, as well as the nature of that limitation, corresponds exactly to 
the state itself. This feature arises from the fact that all of the states in the study adopted their 
constitutional provision long before the research period. Pogue tries (as I will) to capture some of 
the state-specific effects by including as explanatory variables a number of state-specific data, 
such as population size, population density, income data, etc. However, even the amalgamation 
of all the included state-specific data does not serve as a true instrumental variable for the state 
effects, and Pogue never addresses this substantial shortcoming to his model. Pogue, in turn, 
overestimates the reliability of his model’s results. 
 A similar problem plagues Craig Johnson and Kenneth Kriz’s model in their “Fiscal 
Institutions, Credit Ratings, and Borrowing Costs” (2005). Johnson and Kriz are interested in a 
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number of fiscal institutions, such as debt limitations, referendum requirements, balanced budget 
rules, and tax and expenditure limitations; they model the presence or absence of these fiscal 
institutions on default risks, credit ratings, and borrowing costs (84). The authors apply their 
model to all state general obligation bonds during the period from 1990-1997. Like Pogue’s 
model, Johnson and Kriz’s model also includes various state-specific explanatory variables such 
as unemployment rate, personal income rate, and population size (90). The authors find that 
while a referendum requirement does not produce a statistically significant negative effect on the 
costs of capital, state debt limits do, in fact, raise the cost of capital by 3.3 basis points (102).  
 However, a similar specter haunts the work of Johnson and Kriz. Perhaps because their 
model looks at the effects of a variety of fiscal institutions, not all of which originate in the early 
1800s, they fail to acknowledge the problem of the collinearity of state-specific effects and the 
the state constitutional debt limitations. In this regard they fall short of even Pogue’s model, 
because he clearly recognizes and addresses the concern, albeit insufficiently. Despite Johnson 
and Kriz’s lack of “lip service” concerning the collinearity problem, they do, in the end, 
incorporate in their model the same strategy proffered by Pogue. That is, they include as 
explanatory variables their (insufficient) instrumental demographic variables.  
Effectiveness at Limiting Debt Assumed 
 From Ratchford’s seminal article in 1958 to Mary Harris and Vincent Munley’s recent 
work on the effects of debt limitations and referenda requirements on school district bonds, the 
trend seems to point toward an increased cost of capital correlated with the presence of one of 
the four basic forms of constitutional debt limitation. However, as I have noted, these findings 
are somewhat marred by the collinearity problem between the constitutional provisions and the 
state-specific effects. Unfortunately, that same issue will problematize the scholarly literature 
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asking the question: “Do state constitutional debt limitations actually limit the amount of debt 
assumed?” 
 Scott Bollens, in “Examining the Link between State Policy and the Creation of Local 
Special Districts,” looks at the number of special districts nationally during the years 1962, 1967, 
1972, 1977, and 1982, and finds that while the presence of special districts have grown across all 
states during this period, they have grown disproportionately in states with limitations on general 
obligation debt (123). However, his descriptive analysis fails to account for even the most 
modest state-specific effects (such as population size), and compares only the number of special 
districts in each state, and cross-compares these quantities with the presence or absence of 
various statutory and constitutional debt limitation. While his article provides interesting 
correlative information, it lacks the complexity from which to draw causal arguments.  
 The next article under review, Beverly Bunch’s “The Effect of Constitutional Debt 
Limits on State Governments’ Use of Public Authorities” (1991) is an oft-cited and much 
celebrated look at the relationship between constitutional debt limits and the most popular means 
of circumventing those limits. Bunch develops a regression model, and applies the explanatory 
variables in that model on a number of dependent variables, including the number of public 
authorities, the scope of functions addressed by those authorities, and the state’s reliance on 
public authorities to issue infrastructure debt (60). Using cross-sectional data spanning the years 
1982-1986, Bunch finds a positive correlation between constitutional debt limitations and an 
increase in the number of public authorities incorporated, as well as an increase in the scope of 
functions addressed by those authorities and the state’s reliance on public authorities to finance 
infrastructure projects (66).  
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 While Bunch’s article makes a strong argument that the presence of constitutional debt 
limitations do correlate positively with increased use of public authorities, Bunch does not 
establish that those constitutional provisions either have no effect on the amount of debt accrued 
or affect negatively the amount of debt accrued. She focuses, in other words, on the number of 
public authorities incorporated within the states, and not the amount of debt accrued generally. 
Kiewiet and Szakaly address this issue more directly in their “Constitutional Limitations on 
Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness” (1996). Kiewiet and Szakaly find that 
constitutional limitations on state debt do, in fact, correlate negatively with the amount of debt 
issued, but with an important caveat. The lower state-level debt issuance seems to be more than 
made up for by a concomitant increase in local and municipal debt issuances. Kiewiet & Szakaly 
argue that the various constitutional limitations on debt shift the burden of public finance onto 
the shoulders of the municipalities, and that those municipalities finance that increased burden 
through an increased use of public corporations and public authorities.  
V. Research Design 
 My research strives to answer two distinct questions about constitutional limitations on 
state-issued municipal bonds: 1) Do states with constitutional limitations on debt issuance 
actually issue less debt than states with no such limitations?; and 2) Is the cost of capital higher 
for states with constitutional debt limits than it is for states with no such limits? 
A. Data 
My data comes from several sources. I collect data on the specific bond issuances, including 
the bond title, the dollar amount of the issuance, the year of the issuance, the state of origin, and 
the coupon rate, from the Municipal Security Regulatory Board’s (MSRB) Electronic Municipal 
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Market Access (EMMA) website. The MSRB was created by federal legislative action in the 
Securities Acts Amendments of 1970 (hereafter “the Amendments). Among many other edicts, 
the Amendments mandated the creation of an authority to monitor and regulate the municipal 
securities industry. The Amendments accomplished this feat by inserting Section 15B into the 
already existing Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In 2009, the MSRB established the EMMA 
website as “the official repository for municipal securities disclosures” (EMMA website). The 
website provides the public access to many official documents, including the issuer’s prospectus, 
the trades prices and other data about the bond’s trading history, financial disclosure documents, 
as well as a plethora of other information not relevant to this project. From this website, I 
gathered data on nearly ten thousand individual bond issues from six states. These data represent 
all state-issued bonds from the selected states over a period spanning from 2013-2017.  
 My second source of data is the United States Census Bureau’s website. From this source 
I collect state-specific population data, demographic data, income data, and data relating to 
political affiliation, as is included in my regression model. For a history of state credit ratings 
from Standard & Poor’s, I accessed Ballotpedia’s “State Credit Ratings” dataset. Finally, my 
third source of data is Roderick Kiewiet and Kristin Szakaly’s article, Constitutional Limitations 
on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness. In this article, Kiewiet and Szakaly 
divide the states’ myriad forms of constitutional limitations on debt into five categories: those 
states with referenda requirements, those with supermajority requirements, those with strict 
limitations, those with “functional” limitations, and those with no constitutional provision at all. 
There is a de facto sixth category, which is the category of states that have adopted more than 
one of the first four categories. I utilize Kiewiet and Szakaly’s framework for organizing state 
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constitutional debt limits, and I have created a series of five dummy variables for each state for 
each year under observation.  
B. Methodology 
What at first glance seems a simple series of questions to model proves itself upon closer 
deliberation to be much more complicated. The problem, touched on briefly in the literature 
review, arises from the perfect collinearity between two explanatory variables. As I explained in 
the historical overview, the several states adopted the constitutional debt limitations 
predominantly in the mid-1800s, long before reliable annual state-level data were available. 
Because the data set utilized in this research comes from the 21st century, there is no intrastate 
variability to distinguish the effects of the explanatory variables which are the constitutional 
limitation dummy variables and the explanatory variable which is the state-specific random 
effects. For example, while it is not true that all bonds with referendum requirements will 
originate from Kentucky, it is unfortunately true that all bonds originating from Kentucky will be 
limited by referendum requirements. The inability to disentangle the explanatory variable from 
the state-specific effects leads to a strict limitation on the results of this research. I can offer a 
descriptive comparison of states with various combinations of my dummy variables, but it would 
be academically disingenuous to draw causal inferences from these descriptive analyses. In other 
words, I can argue that states without any constitutional limitation on debt do, in fact, issue more 
debt on average than those states with some sort of constitutional stricture, but I cannot argue 
from that information that the model proves that the constitutional limitations cause the states to 
issue less debt.  
 This fact is further illustrated when I apply regression modeling to the data. If, for 
example, I use only two states, and I run a regression in which coupon rate is the dependent 
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variable and the constitutional limitation dummy variables are the explanatory variables, I get a 
result. However, that result is the same as if I had simply averaged all of the coupon rates for 
each year for each state, and then averaged the difference between the two states over the years 
studied. This result is equally true if bonds from all six states are included in the regression. The 
regression produces those results, but those results are no different than simply performing a 
descriptive analysis of the average difference of the average coupon rate over the six states, over 
again the years in question. For the sake of posterity, I conduct the analysis both ways; I build 
multivariate regression models that explain coupon rate and debt per capita as a function of the 
dummy variables, as well as various demographic variables. I then simply perform a descriptive 
statistical analysis of the average differences between the states based upon the dummy 
variables. While I can argue a causal connection between the demographic data and the 
dependent variables (because that demographic data changes intrastate from year to year), I 
cannot reasonably argue a causal connection between the dummy variables and the dependent 
variables.  
 In conclusion, I explain why I have included demographic data. This is an attempt, 
however inadequate, to account for some of the state-specific effects. Because the demographic 
data changes from year to year within each state, it is the perfect candidate for an explanatory 
variable in a multivariate regression model. Furthermore, the inclusion of state-specific 
demographic data captures some, but not all, of the state-specific effects. In other words, some of 
the effect of a bond being issued in California is likely explained by California’s population size. 
This fact is also true of California’s income per capita, its racial composition, etc. By including 
state-specific demographic data into the model, I shrink the size of the state-specific effects that 
otherwise cannot be disentangled from the dummy variables. Unfortunately, however, no 
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practical number of state-specific demographic explanatory variables will eliminate the states’ 
effects to the degree necessary to reasonably argue causation between those dummies and the 
dependent variables. In other words, there is no practical manner to construct a reliable 
instrumental variable for the state-specific effects. In the end, I am left with a carefully 
conceptualized descriptive analysis.  
VI. Results 
 To begin, I illustrate the problem of collinearity with the modelling of the effects of debt 
limits on coupon rate, I simplify the dataset significantly. I isolate the simplified model to bonds 
issued in the year 2014 by two states: Alabama (1) and Alaska (2). I apply the following model: 
CouponRate = α + βstate + βreferenda + ε 
The results are as follows: 
Coupon Rate Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
State 0.2696211 0.1769187 1.52 0.13 -0.0804958        0.6197379 
Referendum 0 (omitted)    
_cons 4.130379 0.3177926 13 0 3.501477              4.759281 
 
Note that “Referendum” was omitted as an explanatory variable, because the presence or absence 
of a referenda requirement is perfectly collinear with the state. This perfect collinearity exists 
equally with all forms of debt limitations in relation to the state, because no state changes its 
constitutional debt strictures during the period encompassed in the sample. However, this 
problem is solved easily enough – I now omit the “State” variable as an explanatory variable, 
and regress the coupon rate using only the presence or absence of the referendum requirement: 
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CouponRate = α + βreferenda + ε 
Coupon Rate Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Referendum 0.2696211 0.1769187 1.52 0.13 -0.0804958        .6197379 
_cons 4.4 0.152416 28.87 0 4.098373           4.701627 
 
Problem solved! I now have a coefficient for the effect that the “Referendum” variable has on the 
coupon rate (albeit not a statistically significant one). Note that this is the result argued by more 
than one author in the literature review of this paper. There is a significant limitation to this 
finding, however. In order to fully illuminate the nature of this limitation, I take a detour for a 
moment into some simple descriptive statistics.  
 First, I calculate the means of the CouponRate for each of my two categorical variables.  
Referendum = 0      
 Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. 
 CouponRate 33 4.4 1.249562 
     
Referendum = 1     
 Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. 
 CouponRate 95 4.669621 0.704303 
 
The mean of the coupon rates in the absence of a referendum requirement is 4.4. The mean of the 
coupon rates with the presence of a referendum requirement is 4.669621. The difference between 
them means is 4.669621 – 4.4 = 0.269621, which matches exactly the coefficient from our 
regression analysis. Because of the collinearity between the states and the constitutional 
strictures, I cannot model a regression analysis that disentangles the two. As such, the results of a 
regression analysis that explains the coupon rate in terms of constitutional strictures is nothing 
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more than a descriptive comparison of differences of averages. To utilize regression in this 
instance is to mask simplicity in complexity’s clothing.  
 Some researchers have tried to further disentangle the collinearity of the State variable 
and various debt limit variables by including demographic data in the model that serve as 
(inadequate) instrumental variables capturing the State variable effect. Thus, the argument goes, 
some of the State effect is captured by an explanatory variable expressing state revenue. 
Different aspects of the State effect are captured by racial and political data. Adding the other 
three debt limitation categorical variables and other demographic variables over a period of years 
can certainly conceal this basic descriptive relationship expressed in the coefficients, but adding 
the complexity does not fundamentally alter the relationship. Thus, for example:  
 CouponRate = α + βyear + βprincipal + βreferenda + βsupermajority + βhardlimit + βsoftlimit + βgovernor + 
βhouse + βsenate + βpopulation + βstatepercgdp + βgdppercapita + βemployment + βrace1 + βrace2 + βrace3 + βrace4 + 
βrace5 + ε 
Where:  
CouponRate = the interest rate offered on the bond 
Year = the year issued 
Principal = the amount of the issuance 
Referenda = a categorical variable denoting a referendum requirement 
Supermajority = a categorical variable denoting a supermajority requirement 
Hardlimit = a categorical variable denoting a hard limit on debt issuance 
Softlimit = a categorical variable denoting a formulaic limit on debt issuance 
Governor = a categorical variable denoting the party affiliation of the governor 
House = a categorical variable denoting the party affiliation of the state house 
Senate = a categorical variable denoting the party affiliation of the state senate 
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Population = the total population size 
Statepercgdp = the state’s percentage of total GDP 
Unemployment = the rate of unemployment 
Race1 = White 
Race2 = Black or African American 
Race3 = American Indian or Alaska Native 
Race4 = Asian 
Race5 = Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
 
Number of obs.  7217    
R2 0.1182    
     
CouponRate Coef. Std. Error t [95% Conf. Interval] 
Year 1.227238 0.1320712 9.29 0.96834               1.486136 
Referendum 3.302464 1.423948 2.32 0.5111081           6.093819 
Supermajority -137.5773 44.7119 -3.08 -225.2257         149.92883 
HardLimit -109.1745 18.10714 -6.03 -144.6698          -73.67918 
SoftLimit 0 (omitted)   
Governor -0.6041343 0.1262202 -4.79 -0.8515629      -0.3567057 
StateHouse 5.330741 0.4202514 12.68 4.506924             6.154557 
StateSenate -0.0356024 0.1001178 -3.56 -0.5522846        -0.159764 
Population 6.83E-06 1.52E-06 4.49 3.85E-06             9.81E-06 
GDPbyState 0.000337 3.85E-06 8.75 0.0000261         0.0000412 
GDPpercapita -190.4229 40.10411 -4.75 -269.0387          -111.8071 
TotalEmployment -7.93E-06 1.12E-06 -7.08 -0000101           -5.73E-06 
Race1_percapita 4249.563 489.7029 8.68 3289.602             5209.524 
Race2_percapita 4123.118 486.3769 8.48 3169.677               5076.56 
Race3_percapita 4227.442 503.4163 8.4 3240.598             5214.286 
Race4_percapita 3390.511 514.1529 6.59 2382.621             4398.402 
_cons -6568.955 645.0086 -10.18 -7833.361          -5304.549 
 
Note that not only is the Referendum coefficient substantially different from the result in our 
simplified model, but the coefficient is now statistically significant. However (and this is the 
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crux of the limitation on the regression model), because the added demographic variable will 
always only partially capture the state effects, the statistical significance indicates only that there 
is a correlation. I cannot argue a causal relationship from this flawed model. As such, I am left to 
present a descriptive analysis of the data.  
 There are several severe limitations to conducting a fifty-state descriptive analysis of 
state-issued municipal debt. There is no standardized reporting methodology for “aggregate” 
state-level coupon rates, nor is there a standard repository for this information, other than the 
MSRB’s EMMA website. Unfortunately, EMMA reports coupon rates on individual issuances, 
and many states have multiple thousands of issuances per year, making the task of assembling a 
comprehensive database of all fifty states over a period of years a task too daunting for the scope 
of this research. I begin, however, by examining the aggregated data from the six states I 
incorporated into my earlier regression analysis.  
Mean Coupon Rate by State and Year 
 Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado 
2013 4.17 4.64 4.79 3.03 4 4.31 
2014 4.3 2.36 4.25 3.41 4 4.09 
2015 4.22 4.34 4.42 3.41 4.11 4.56 
2016 4.43 4.82 4.64 3.5 4.48 4.33 
2017 3.98 4.72 4.25 3.09 4.08 3.64 
 
 The first noticeable trend is that there does not seem to be a noticeable trend. Arkansas is 
the only state that seems to consistently have access to significantly cheaper capital. However, 
while Arkansas has relatively strong strictures against state debt issuances, with both a 
constitutional referendum requirement and a constitutional hard limit on the amount of debt 
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issued, these restrictions mirror those of Alaska, which trends toward the highest cost of capital 
among the six. Alabama, Arizona, and Colorado all have hard limits only, and California has 
both a supermajority requirement and a referendum requirement. In short, this data tells us little.  
 I next examine a more easily accessed data set that reflects the cost of capital; namely, 
the states’ Standard & Poor’s credit rating. I gathered data on the credit ratings for the years 
under study (2013-2017). I coded those ratings numerically (AAA=1, AA+=2, AA=3, etc.)  and 
then took the average of the years for each state. I then categorized the states according to their 
constitutional debt limitation provisions, and my results follow: 
 Yes No 
Referendum 2.8 2.15862069 
Supermajority 2.933333333 2.268421053 
Hard Limit 2.523076923 2.394594595 
Soft Limit 1.92 2.645714286 
No Limitations 2.28 2.444444444 
  
 Again, while there is substantial variability between the states, that variability does not 
seem to correlate with the absence or presence of any of the constitutional debt limitations, nor 
does it correlate with the absence of such limitation compared to the presence of one or more.  
 While there seems to be little correlative evidence that constitutional limitations on debt 
issuance affect the coupon rate (or alternatively, the cost of capital) to the state, there does seem 
to be a correlation between some forms of debt limitation and the amount of debt issued by the 
states. 
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Referendum Yes  No 
Public Debt (billions) 32.17295238 16.50406897 
Public Debt per Capita (millions) 3814.548712 3724.642836 
   
Supermajority Yes  No 
Public Debt (billions) 36.538 18.83668421 
Public Debt per Capita (millions) 4547.73148 3514.404933 
   
Hard Limit Yes  No 
Public Debt (billions) 14.41415385 26.13151351 
Public Debt per Capita (millions) 2525.41433 4197.021052 
   
Soft Limit Yes  No 
Public Debt (billions) 15.79773333 26.20811429 
Public Debt per Capita (millions) 3104.002258 4044.575181 
   
No Limit Yes  No 
Public Debt (billions) 15.9416 23.87871111 
Public Debt per Capita (millions) 5228.679631 3599.483712 
 
While the referendum requirement seems to be weakly correlated with increased borrowing, and 
the supermajority requirement seems to be even more so positively correlated with debt issuance, 
both the hard and soft limits are strongly correlated with an effective decrease in the amount of 
debt issued. Furthermore, the strongest negative correlation in the lot lies between not having any 
constitutional strictures, and having one or more. While we can not draw causal inferences from 
these results, these results are in keeping with what one would expect if the constitutional 
strictures are, in fact, effective in limiting the amount of debt issued.  
VII. Conclusion 
 In conclusion, I want to step back and look at the broader strokes of the implications of 
this research. In doing so, I want to make two points. First, as policy analysts, we can be 
confronted with legislative proposals or actions that would seem to have massive, unmeasurable 
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consequences to the well-being of the governed body, be it a municipality, a state, or a national 
government. In our example, I would argue that it is reasonable to assume that constitutionally 
mandated strictures on a state’s ability to issue debt and raise capital potentially have a 
significant effect on that state’s fiscal health, be it through increased/decreased cost of capital, 
the willingness or ability of the state’s legislators to take on new debt, or any other number of 
possible consequences. However, because of the history and nature of the constitutional 
mandates, it is practically impossible to quantitatively measure the effects of the policy, once 
implemented. We, as policy analysts, assume that the policy is affecting the market, but we have 
no way to measure these effects. There are no performance measures. The best we can do is to 
extrapolate from simple descriptive statistical comparisons, and recognize the profound 
limitations to this approach.  
 My second point serves as a counterpoint to my first. In the end, the policy analyst really 
does not need to know how much a constitutional stricture on debt issuance actually affects the 
amounts issued by the states in order to judge the success or failure of the policy. In order to 
explain this assertion, I refer all the way back to the beginning of this paper, specifically to the 
“Historical Background” section. Reeling from the Depression of 1837, states were struggling to 
regain their ability to raise capital. Nine states defaulted on their debt obligations, the federal 
government was refusing to assume the massive debts accumulated, and investors were citing the 
mantra, “fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.” States were desperate to 
regain their creditworthiness, and the passage of strict fiscal responsibility requirements into the 
states’ constitutions was one piece of the process to regain the trust of the investing community. 
It is possible that the legislators passing these constitutional provisions did not even care if they 
functioned as actual limits or not. Their goal was to send as many signals to the market as 
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possible that they had learned their lessons, and that fiscal responsibility was first priority 
moving forward. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the combined states in 2015 owed more 
than $1.15 trillion in outstanding debt issuances. That tells us two things; 1) the constitutional 
debt limitations are marginally effective, at best; and 2) investors seem more than happy to trust 
the fiscal security of the states. In one manner of interpretation, the constitutional debt limitations 
are an utter failure. But in another regard, perhaps they are fabulously successful. 
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